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Dear Lance,
Here is a thinkpiece on Ghana? Is this the approach you want? I hesitate to 
put up a tightly articulated project until we see what sectors - themes - 
issues are common. Last time we didn't have enough common core and if each 
country person does "his own thing" this time when divergences (at least at 
superficial level) should be wider (sic!) there may be no common core left.
I do think the employment, production by poor people, human dimension and 
export (or return to external balance) aspects are fairly general. (They fit 
Philippines where I've been this year as well as Africa, albeit the total lack 
of any coherent, credible export development strategy may apply only to SSA 
plus smaller Asian and LA cases.) They also do link with the sub-class/social 
group common core head (not that it proved to be covered by everybody) in 
first round.
I am trying - per our earlier correspondence - to locate a Ghanaian co-worker.
Cordially,
£ c y ? A ¿ <  ^  ; C / ^ V  tz o U  hi .
C o m p a n y  no . 877338 lim ited  by g u a ra n te e  a n d  re g is te re d  in E n g la n d
GHANA - Medium Term Questions
Introduction - Where We Are and Why
Ghana is a concrete demonstration that a fairly standard stabilisation and 
adjustment programme can survive, evolve and yield at least some demonstrably 
positive effects. This is not necessarily a generalisable conclusion since 
Ghana had several actually or potentially positive preconditions/developments 
which have been at least conducive to and probably vital to survival and 
partial success:
a. a disastrous opening situation (a 10 year study decline and arguably an 
18 year one) creating a receptiveness to change;
b. a set of exogenous disasters - drought, expelled workers returning from 
Nigeria, fires in cocoa plantations - on which all the perceived problems 
during initial year could be blamed;
c. a currency so fantastically overvalued that most imports bought by 
consumers were at 'shadow' prices and many exports were smuggled almost 
totally for currency valuation reasons;
d. a good evolution of weather in the second and third years of the 
programme resulting in rapid (and partly unsustainable) falls in 
inflation, in absolute (and relative) food prices and in physical 
shortages of food;
e. a government which had secured a degree of credibility as broadly honest, 
determined to act and concerned for the ''national interest” and had taken 
major steps (some such as a much higher real cocoa price and prompter 
payment crucial to the latter programme success) in a stabilisation 
programme of its own;
f. very significant rises in net foreign resources inflow which meant that - 
after a lag since it took about 12 months from the March 1983 'agreement'
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to substantial added resource/import availability - there was no cutback 
in imports or consumption except during the 'shock policies in
place'/'resource flows in pipeline' phase when it could ("b") be put down 
to the drought and expulsions/return of workers.
Over 1984-1987 Ghana has achieved growth of GDP averaging 5.5Í to 6% a year; 
managed to raise real wages and (after a drastic fall in 1983) real export 
crop prices; reduced government recurrent deficits largely by revenue raising 
and allowing some stabilisation of real recurrent (excluding the debt service 
explosion) and a sharp real recovery of public GFCF; significant export rises; 
and - even in a coastal savannah drought year in 1987 - avoidance of food
shortages/price explosions.
Notably however, very little progress was made in raising average food grower 
income increases or in empowering the poorest three regions' (Northern, Upper 
East, Upper West) and urban slums' residents to raise their incomes. Equally
the balance of trade and current account gaps, if anything, appear to be
widening. Policy has evolved - e.g. PAMSCAD (programme to ameliorate the 
social cost of adjustment and development) is an attempt to address the basic 
service access, employment and - to a lesser degree - empowering of the poor 
to produce issues of the poorer regions and urban slums as well as programme 
retrenched civil servants.
Some Future Problematics or Parameters
At least nine major questions arise as to the degree of sustainability and 
future problems and potentials of GHASASAPS (Ghana Stabilisation and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes):
a. agriculture and in particular food production;
b. industry and the ability to alter structures of production in a coherent
manner consistent with general patterns of historic structural change in 
economies which have achieved upper middle levels of output per capita;
c. exports - both traditional and potential - from production, price, import
capacity and development strategy/finance parametric points of view;
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d. creation of a government recurrent budgetary process consistent with 
prioritisation, monitoring and even minimal efficiency in resource 
allocation and utilisation;
e. articulating human dimensions (production by poor/universal access to 
basic service) components in political economic development goals to 
allow quantifiable targets, resource allocations and programmes/projects;
f. sustainability of growth and balance aspects of programmes (macro and 
sectoral);
g. what articulated programmes related to employment/self-employment are 
possible and which are not;
h. sustainability of structural change process both in technical and income 
distribution/power to earn terms;
i. political sustainability/"adjustment fatigue".
Agriculture - What Happens Why and How
Agriculture (excluding cocoa) is a policy void, an area of random or whimsical
public sector resource allocation and one with so little data there is
probably a — 25Í margin of error on food output and some doubt that except in
extreme drought or drought break years one even knows with any certainty the
direction (i.e. sign) of inter-year change.
The implications are serious. Over 1955-1980 food output per capita
apparently declined at a trend rate in excess of 1* a year (or did it?).
Grower food prices (uncontrolled) tended - except in drought - not to lead the 
CPI by much but consumer food prices led (transport and trade margins
widened). In 1986 the relative price of food even at retail was lower than it 
had been in a decade. While detailed output data exist they are inconsistent 
with other and with plausibility (e.g. low or nil grain output growth and
nominal price decline).
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As a result the food output growth projections to 1993 and 2% for the World 
Bank (well below population growth in a country with severe malnourishment) 
but 4Í for the government (safely above population growth). Worse neither the 
Bank nor Ghana seems to have focussed on the strategic seriousness of this 
divergence.
One reason may be that the policy tools available for most of agriculture - 
especially households basically growing almost enough food to eat and having 
to sell some of that because of limited other cash earning activities - are 
rusty, broken or non-existent. No national research, extension, monitoring of 
distribution of inputs, coherent priorities on spending, plausible selection 
of projects (some are plausible but that seems to be micro or accidental), 
etc.
Industry (manufacturing including mineral and timber processing) has been 
reviewed in a rehabilitation and current (unrehabilitated, low utilisation, 
financial debilitation) context at sectoral/once-over micro level. It is 
doubtful that this is an adequate base for strategic planning (even by 
enterprises). Some relationships to diversifying primary sector output, 
probable levels and makeup of demand, ways of breaking through to structures 
and levels of exports that might eventually retore trade (visible and 
invisible) balance.
Exports emphasised to date are primarily cocoa, timber and gold with price (at 
least nominally - real cocoa grower prices are barely back to 1982 levels) and 
for the last two somewhat brute force fixed investment. It is most unlikely 
these three can grow enough to rebalance trade. In the case of cocoa the 
analysis has tended to be quantified as if there were no smuggling and no 
smuggling clawback and with little regard to what impact a non-marginal 
addition to world cocoa supply would have on price forecasts. Processing on 
cocoa and timber has been understudied; new export identification has been at 
best ad hoc to the point of random; no attempt at a strategic 
projection/articulation exercise to restore trade balance by 2000 has been 
attempted. (Projections suggest the underlying trade deficit is still rising 
despite fairly rapid export growth.)
There is except in the bank balance reconciling sense no recurrent budgetary 
process. There is no way to assess what past trends in real expenditure by
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ministry or programme nor to decide whether next year allocations will lead to 
a rise or a fall (and if so in which programme or sub-programme where). 
Further data flow and location is such no functional monitoring is possibly by 
operating ministry or Treasury. This must be an inefficient way to allocate 
resources and a near impossible one in which to set priorities or to hold 
anybody accountable for either fiscal or real outcomes. This is a systemic - 
not just a Treasury or Finance Officer - weakness at a near pathological 
level.
Human dimension - production by poor people and universal access to basic 
services - dimensions of adjustment need much more articulation than PAMSCAD 
achieved. Except for seasonal, public sector employment projects, the 
production by poor people aspects are largely conceptual rather than 
articulated, let alone programmed. There appears to be a belief in some key 
quarters that more production by poor people is impossible or not worth 
supporting with policy instruments or resource allocations. Basic services 
universal access seems to suffer not so much from resource unavailability 
(i.e. the quantity externally mobilisable is higher than used) or lack of 
concepts and semi-articulated programmes as from budgetary process detailed 
articulation and administration weaknesses in the health and education 
ministries.
Medium term macro and sectoral projections do not seem to be substantive in 
the sense of assessing implicit levels, flows and growth rates by sectors and 
uses. It is not clear that the 'model' is moving toward sustainability either 
on the food supply or the export level/import capacity fronts.
Whether there is sustainable structural change is unclear because there is no 
specification of structural change priorities, rates and directions in a way 
analogous to that done in - e.g. - Japanese or Korean market management 
planning. The present structural targets are "comparative advantage" (with 
no clear way to determine or intuit it) and fiscal/external account balance 
which hardly seems adequate if Structural Adjustment is to continue until the 
end of the century as a medium/long term rehabilitation and development 
matrix.
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Employment generation (including specified self-employment) strategy is very 
fragmented and its largest component seems unrealistic. While Cocobod rural 
staff given Cocobod lands should be able to revert to being cocoa farmers, the 
general retraining of dismissed civil service (weighted to elderly, low level, 
below average competence) as dynamic, "informal" entrepreneurs appears to be 
very much a triumph of faith over plausibility. The same defects probably 
apply to seasonal/supplementary public works and community area directly 
productive investments beyond the first wave in PAMSCAD.
In some sense Ghana suffers form adjustment fatigue. What does this mean in 
respect to which sub-classes? How is it likely to evolve (or decline) with 
what effects on programme viability or change? Is there - or will there soon 
be - a comparable position by resource suppliers? What impact will/would that 
have on sustainability over what period?
Conclusion - Toward a Project
These specific points or areas may not in this form add up to a coherent 
project. However they do articulate:
a. sectoral weaknesses
b. balance projection problematics
c. human, political - as well as technical - sustainability
They can perhaps best be articulated after seeing what themes in what forms 
are general across a number (a majority or more) of the case study countries.
-RHG
Falmer
22- 111-88
[Secretary’s Note: This has been
transcribed in RHG’s absence]
